Do black lives matter for UK aid? by Price, Sophia
Do	black	lives	matter	for	UK	aid?
Boris	Johnson’s	decision	to	merge	the	Department	for	International	Development	and	the	Foreign	Office	was	long
expected.	But	it	comes	at	a	time	when	the	UK	is	grappling	with	COVID-19,	Brexit	and	the	legacy	of	its	colonial
history.	Sophia	Price	(Leeds	Beckett)	says	using	the	aid	budget	as	a	tool	to	further	Britain’s	interests	abroad	is	an
inward-looking	and	damaging	move.
The	announcement	of	the	merging	of	DfID	with	the	FCO	locates	UK	aid	at	the	intersection	of	COVID-19,	Brexit	and
the	Black	Lives	Matter	movement.	The	move	can	be	viewed	as	an	attempt	to	appease	key	elements	within	a	party
increasingly	worried	about	the	government’s	leadership,	declining	popular	support	over	their	handling	of	the
pandemic,	looming	recession	and	the	impact	the	crisis	will	have	on	achieving	Brexit.	It	is	also	a	decision	that	is
likely	to	have	detrimental	impacts	on	societies	throughout	Africa,	grappling	with	the	social	and	economic	impact	of
the	global	pandemic.	This	move	therefore	raises	questions	about	the	government’s	commitment	to	the	core
principles	of	the	Black	Lives	Matter,	and	prompts	renewed	debate	about	why	we	provide	aid.
UK	aid	shelter	kits	being	unloaded	from	a	RAF	plane	in	Beira,	Mozambique,	after	Cyclone
Idai,	March	2019.	Photo:	DFID	via	a	CC	BY	2.0	licence
Post-Brexit	Global	Britain	and	the	reinvigoration	of	UK	power
The	decision	to	integrate	DfID	into	the	FCO	and	put	the	Foreign	Secretary	in	charge	of	aid	decision-making	marks
an	attempt	to	appease	the	increasingly	nervy	Conservative	party.	There	is	a	longstanding	antipathy	on	the	right
wing	of	the	party	to	the	provision	of	foreign	aid,	and	a	significant	overlap	in	the	Venn	diagram	of	ardent	Brexiteers
and	those	committed	to	the	end	of	DfID	and	reform	of	aid	policy.	Occupying	this	position	are	not	only	Boris	Johnson
and	Dominic	Cummings	but	also	Jacob	Rees-Mogg,	who	very	publicly	delivered	a	Daily	Express	petition	to
Downing	Street	calling	for	cuts	in	foreign	aid,	and	Dominic	Raab,	whose	role	and	power	is	significantly	strengthened
by	this	decision.	This	announcement	therefore	is	not	a	technical	institutional	fix,	but	a	highly	politicised	move	to
shore	up	support	at	a	time	of	crisis	for	the	Conservative	party.
LSE Brexit: Do black lives matter for UK aid? Page 1 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-06-26
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/06/26/do-black-lives-matter-for-uk-aid/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
The	use	of	DfID	and	UK	aid	as	tools	to	offset	internal	Conservative	divisions	was	previously	evident	in	Theresa
May’s	appointment	of	Priti	Patel,	a	vocal	proponent	of	scrapping	DfID,	as	Secretary	of	State	for	International
Development.	Her	appointment	was	later	mirrored	by	that	of	Anne-Marie	Trevelyan,	the	current	Secretary	of	State
for	International	Development,	who	had	previously	voiced	scepticism	about	the	provision	of	UK	aid.	Like	Patel,
Trevelyan	is	a	member	of	the	European	Research	Group	and	a	prominent	member	of	the	Vote	Leave	campaign.
Penny	Mordaunt,	another	keen	Brexiteer	and	ERG	subscriber,	also	held	the	post,	replacing	Patel	in	2017	after	her
resignation.	Through	the	appointments	of	the	last	five	Secretaries	of	State	for	International	Development	there	has
been	an	increasing	focus	on	re-orientating	UK	aid	to	meet	the	imperatives	of	a	post-Brexit	Global	Britain	and	a
redefined	national	interest.
Although	unexpected	in	its	timing,	Johnson’s	announcement	has	long	been	predicted.	In	addition	to	setting	up	a
wholescale	review	of	UK	strategic	defence	and	foreign	policy,	Johnson	wrote	the	foreword	to	the	2019	report	Global
Britain:	A	Twenty	First	Century	Vision,	which	set	the	scene	for	the	current	reshaping	of	UK	aid.	Co-authored	by
Brexiteer	MP	Bob	Seely,	the	report	recommended	the	integration	of	DfID	into	the	FCO	and	a	redefinition	of	the
principles	of	aid	provision.	However,	the	announcement	pre-empts	the	outcome	of	the	government’s	delayed	review
of	strategic	defence	and	foreign	policy,	to	be	led	by	John	Bew.	While	this	was	not	yet	complete	there	were	early
augurs	of	what	it	might	have	in	store.	Like	Seely’s	2019	report,	Bew’s	co-authored	2016	report	Making	Sense	of
British	Foreign	Policy	After	Brexit	sets	out	prescriptions	for	the	reinvigoration	of	British	global	power.	The	report
sees	Brexit	as	an	opportunity	to	“craft	a	more	coherent	overall	strategy	for	trade,	foreign	aid	and	defence”.	There	is
a	strong	focus	on	the	operation	and	projection	of	military	and	hard	power	and	concern	of	the	threat	to	‘Brexit	Britain’
from	an	over-emphasis	on	trade/economic	aspects	of	foreign	policy	over	the	security	dimension.	The	report
recommends	bandwaggoning	with	the	USA	in	a	reinvigorated	special	relationship,	and	strengthening	the	UK’s	role
in	NATO.
Importantly,	Bew’s	2016	report	emphasises	that,	in	the	context	of	the	post	Brexit	changing	balance	of	power,	the
UK	ought	to	renew	its	attention	on	Eastern	Europe,	and	offer	‘third	party’	solidarity	to	those	in	fear	of	a	Franco-
German	rapprochement	with	Russia	and	a	counter	to	the	power	of	Germany	within	‘EU	federalism’.	The	report	also
suggested	that	the	foreign	aid	budget	should	be	used	to	shore	up	military	and	diplomatic	capabilities	and	be
diverted	to	Eastern	Europe	to	offset	some	of	the	funding	losses	which	“these	countries	will	certainly	incur	after
Brexit,	in	order	to	strengthen	goodwill	and	counteract	possible	attempts	to	offer	punitive	terms	to	the	UK	in	Brexit
negotiations”.	This	helps	to	contextualise	the	rather	incongruous	statement	within	Johnson’s	16	June
announcement,	which	equated	aid	to	Zambia	to	that	of	Ukraine	and	highlighted	how	the	UK	provides	“ten	times	as
much	aid	to	Tanzania	as	we	do	to	the	six	countries	of	the	Western	Balkans,	who	are	acutely	vulnerable	to	Russian
meddling”.
While	this	decision	will	bring	wholescale	institutional	change,	it	represents	just	the	latest	stage	in	the	ongoing
reorientation	of	aid	spending.	There	had	already	been	a	drop	in	the	proportion	of	total	UK	aid	spent	by	DfID	in
comparison	to	other	government	departments,	including	the	FCO,	from	86.2%	in	2014	to	74.9%	in	2018.
Furthermore	there	has	been	increased	rhetoric	that	the	purpose	of	aid	provision	should	be	to	meet	donor
imperatives.	This	has	been	framed	within	the	‘Value	for	Money’	mantra,	reiterated	in	Johnson’s	announcement,
which	determines	that	aid	money	should	deliver	on	UK	national	interests	and	provide	returns	to	the	UK	economy,
particularly	through	engagement	with	UK	business	and	underwriting	the	expansion	of	UK	private	investment.	This
has	been	presented	as	the	liberal	win-win	of	economic	development,	delivering	gains	to	donor	and	recipient	alike,
and	embodied	in	the	creation	of	new	financing	mechanisms	such	as	aid	blending	and	in	the	positioning	of	the	City
of	London	at	the	heart	of	UK	development	policy.
Johnson’s	announcement	marks	a	further	step	in	the	pursuit	of	putting	aid	monies	to	work	for	the	operation	and
realisation	of	British	power,	and	the	subordination	of	development	priorities	to	foreign	policy	interests.	The	rhetoric
has	shifted	accordingly	to	a	more	explicit	focus	on	the	hard	power	of	military	and	security	capacity,	with	Johnson
stating	that	the	“distinctions	between	diplomacy	and	overseas	development	are	artificial	and	outdated”.	The	move
also	marks	a	shift	towards	greater	unilateralism.	Historically	DfID	has	been	effective	as	a	mechanism	for	the
leveraging	of	UK	power	through	cooperation,	by	being	a	leading	actor	in	the	expression	and	operation	of
development	policy	at	the	regional	level	through	the	EU,	and	at	the	global	level	through	key	institutions	such	as	the
World	Bank.	Folding	it	into	the	FCO	represents	a	step	away	from	the	policy	leadership	and	actorness	it	previously
enjoyed,	and	a	foreign	policy	desire	to	‘go	it	alone’.
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The	institutional	implications	are	also	towards	greater	centralisation	of	policy	making.	The	Foreign	Secretary	‘will	be
empowered	to	decide	which	countries	receive	-or	cease	to	receive-	British	aid’	within	a	single	UK	strategy	for	each
country	overseen	by	the	Prime	Minister.	This	centralisation	is	intensified	by	the	perception	that	the	FCO	lacks
transparency,	which	will	be	exacerbated	by	the	reported	closure	of	the	House	of	Commons	International
Development	Committee	as	a	forum	for	oversight	and	scrutiny.
Aid	provision	and	the	COVID-19	crisis
In	spite	of	the	Prime	Minister’s	assurances	of	a	continued	commitment	to	global	health,	the	merger	will	necessarily
also	mean	a	change	in	policy	focus	away	from	poverty	reduction	and	social	development.	This	move	has	particular
significance	at	a	time	of	global	pandemic.	UK	aid	through	DfID	had	a	significant	role	in	supporting	health	systems	in
recipient	countries.	In	2018	14%	of	UK	bilateral	aid	was	spent	on	health	provision,	matching	the	proportion	spent	on
humanitarian	aid.	Within	health	aid	spending,	the	three	leading	areas	were	medical	research,	family	planning	and
health	and	administrative	management.
During	the	current	pandemic,	the	World	Health	Organisation	(WHO)	has	highlighted	the	importance	of	UK
assistance	to	the	African	continent	in	terms	of	capacity	building	and	the	deployment	of	UK	emergency	medical
teams.	According	to	DfID,	in	2018	the	top	20	recipients	of	UK	aid	were	either	Asian	or	African	countries,	with	the	top
five	being	Pakistan,	Ethiopia,	Nigeria,	Afghanistan	and	Syria.	In	Nigeria	and	Ethiopia	between	2015-2018,	the
largest	sectors	of	ODA	funding	were	health	and	humanitarian	aid.	While	by	region	more	aid	has	been	focused	on
Africa,	and	from	2014	onwards	this	was	steadily	increasing,	in	2018	it	decreased	by	4.4%,	with	Somalia	suffering
the	largest	reduction	in	spend	to	all	African	countries.	Moreover,	although	the	majority	(62.5%)	of	UK	aid	went	to
Least	Developed	(LDC)	and	Other	Low	Income	Countries	(Other	LICS),	this	decreased	by	11.7%	in	2018,	while
Low	Middle	Income	Countries	experienced	a	slight	increase.
The	changing	priorities	in	aid	spending	and	management	will	have	profound	impacts	on	the	poorest	and	most
vulnerable	communities	in	the	world,	already	struggling	to	deal	with	the	global	pandemic.	While	Africa	currently
accounts	for	only	a	small	proportion	of	global	cases,	the	spread	of	the	pandemic	is	accelerating	rapidly	across	the
continent,	from	taking	98	days	to	get	to	100,000	cases	to	reaching	200,000	after	19	days.	More	than	the	70%	of	the
deaths	on	the	continent	have	been	focused	on	five	countries:	Algeria,	Egypt,	Sudan,	Nigeria	and	South	Africa.
African	countries	have	acted	quickly	to	put	social	restrictions	and	public	health	measures	in	place,	scaling	up	health
workforces	and	laboratory	capacities	and	enacting	border	controls	which	have	been	effective	at	slowing	the	spread
of	COVID-19.	However,	the	WHO	highlights	how	containment	and	mitigation	strategies	have	been	challenged	by
capacity	constraints,	particularly	in	relation	to	testing	and	diagnosis,	inadequate	quantities	and	quality	of	PPE	and
other	healthcare	provisions,	as	well	as	the	difficulties	of	managing	unofficial	border	crossings,	all	of	which	have
contributed	to	the	rapid	spread	through	the	continent.
In	terms	of	COVID-19	morbidity	factors,	Sub-Saharan	Africa	benefits	from	a	relatively	small	(3%)	of	its	population
being	over	65	yrs	old	(compared	to	10%	in	China	and	20%	in	Europe)	and	with	more	than	60%	under	25.	However
the	continent	also	has	the	highest	global	rates	of	people	suffering	from	HIV/AIDs,	TB	and	malaria.	Not	only	does
this	compound	the	challenges	already	facing	health	systems,	but	pre-existing	conditions,	particularly	chronic
respiratory	diseases,	are	key	co-morbidities	associated	with	poor	COVID-19	outcomes.
The	threat	to	health	and	socio-economic	wellbeing,	both	directly	related	to	COVID-19	and	in	terms	of	the	declining
provision	and	support	for	those	suffering	other	conditions,	is	compounded	by	economic	crisis	and	poverty.	The
WHO	highlights	how	restrictions	on	movement	and	economic	activity	have	taken	a	heavy	toll	on	the	most
marginalised	and	vulnerable	communities.	This	has	compounded	the	already	precarious	economic	position	of	the
continent.	2019	had	witnessed	a	decline	in	FDI	to	Africa	following	lukewarm	global	and	regional	GDP	growth,	and
dampened	demand	for	commodities.	COVID-19	has	intensified	this,	combining	declining	commodity	prices,
particularly	for	oil,	with	large	scale	hits	to	manufacturing,	global	value	chains	and	rapid	reductions	in	FDI.	The	World
Investment	Report	2020	predicts	that	FDI	to	Africa	is	set	to	contract	between	25-40%.	This	raises	obvious	concerns
about	the	funding	of	programmes	to	fight	COVID-19	in	addition	to	HIV,	tuberculosis	and	other	diseases.	The	recent
move	by	Nigeria,	an	economy	heavily	dependent	on	oil,	to	cut	its	health	budget	by	40%	embodies	those	concerns.
Time	to	repair
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Johnson’s	decision	to	fundamentally	change	the	departmental	structure	designed	to	tackle	pandemics	and	poverty
is	open	to	question.	The	realist	policy	shift	to	the	pursuit	of	hard	power	and	relative	gains	overlooks	the	everyday
experiences	of	those	living	with	the	crisis.	However,	it	does	raise	key	questions	about	why	and	how	we	provide	aid.
There	have	been	vibrant	debates	about	the	purpose	of	aid.	In	addition	to	ideas	of	justice,	morality	and	ethics,	these
are	frequently	framed	within	the	coloniality	of	the	project	to	develop	states	in	the	Western	image	within	unequal,
exploitative	and	paternalistic	relationships.	Within	African	politics	this	questioning	has	taken	shape	in	‘post-aid’
policy	frameworks	to	address	ongoing	aid	dependence,	as	seen	in	the	Ghana	‘Beyond	Aid’	strategy.	However,
COVID-19	has	revealed	the	vulnerabilities	that	rest	on	pre-existing	inequalities	and	structures	of	power	within	the
global	economy.	In	this	context,	and	with	the	raising	public	consciousness	about	the	enduring	impact	of	slavery	and
colonialism	on	contemporary	societies	and	economies	around	the	world,	new	ideas	about	how	to	repair	these
legacies	are	taking	shape.	These	could	be	built	around	our	commitment	to	provide	0.7%	of	UK	GNI	to	others.
Yet	within	current	UK	aid	and	foreign	policymaking	there	is	little	reflection	on	its	relation	to	the	legacies	of
colonialism.	Johnson’s	view	of	DfID’s	work	was	that	it	was	“the	finest	demonstration	of	British	values,	following	in
the	great	tradition	of	the	country	that	ended	the	slave	trade”,	without	a	concomitant	acknowledgement	of	the	role
the	British	Empire	played	in	creating	and	reproducing	that	trade.	A	more	reflective	position	might	have	both
recognised	that	history	and	the	role	that	aid	could	play	in	repairing	those	injustices	and	the	enduring	inequalities
that	stem	from	them.
The	concept	of	reparation	has	been	at	the	heart	of	the	Black	Lives	Matter	campaigns,	particularly	in	the	USA	but
also	in	the	UK	in	relation	to	the	role	and	profiteering	of	leading	financial	institutions	and	corporations	such	as	Lloyds
and	Greene	King	in	the	slave	trade.	In	calling	for	reparations	to	the	Caribbean,	Hilary	Beckles,	Chair	of	the	Caricom
Reparations	Commission,	pointed	to	the	negative	impact	of	the	British	legacy	of	slavery	and	colonialisation	on	black
communities	and	said:	“Public	consciousness	is	catching	up	with	history:	that	moment	has	come.	British	public
morality	has	caught	up	with	its	own	institutional	history	of	slavery.”	Other	prominent	figures	such	as	Michelle
Bachelet,	the	UN	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights,	urged	countries	to	confront	legacies	of	slavery	and
colonialism	and	called	for	reparations	in	various	forms	to	‘make	amends	for	centuries	of	violence	and
discrimination’.
The	combination	of	the	pandemic,	which	has	a	disproportionately	negative	impact	on	BAME	communities	around
the	world,	and	the	gathering	Black	Lives	Matter	movement,	which	highlights	those	enduring	racialised	inequalities
and	legacies	of	colonialism,	could	be	an	opportunity	to	reformulate	aid	provision	around	the	ideas	of	reparation	and
justice.	But	strong	factions	in	the	Conservative	party	are	historically	opposed	to	development	aid.	The	government’s
struggles	to	placate	them	both	reflect	and	intensify	its	attempts	to	‘Get	Brexit	Done’	while	managing	the	pandemic.
The	decision	on	DfID	and	aid	spending	has	moved	away	from	a	more	progressive	turn	in	our	policies	towards	the
rest	of	the	world.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog,	nor	LSE.
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